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SCHORR

THE EFFECT OF HURST V. FLORIDA
ON JUDICIAL OVERRIDE IN ALABAMA
CAROLYN SCHORR*

INTRODUCTION
Montez Spradley should be dead. A trial judge in Alabama overrode a jury’s decision to sentence Mr. Spradley to life in prison and sentenced him to die for a crime that he did not commit.1 The judge was
well aware of the unreliability of a key witness in the case against Mr.
Spradley and that information regarding the witness’ reliability had
been withheld from his attorneys.2 In 2011, Mr. Spradley entered into
an Alford plea, pleading guilty to the crime while maintaining his innocence, and escaped death row and prison after nine and a half years. 3
Walter McMillian, a Black man, was sentenced to die for the murder of
a white woman in Monroe County, Alabama.4 Like the judge in Montez
Spradley’s case, Judge Robert E. Lee Key overrode the jury’s life verdict and imposed the death penalty on Mr. McMillian.5 He spent six
years on death row before being exonerated due to the fact that the
State’s witnesses had lied on the stand, and the prosecution suppressed
exculpatory evidence.6 Equal Justice Initiative asserted in 2011 that of
the ninety-three people sentenced to death by judicial override in the
© 2018 Carolyn Schorr
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
I would like to thank my family and my husband for their support throughout my law school
experience. Special thanks to Katy O’Donnell, Karyn Meriwether, and Brandon Taylor for their
mentorship and love while writing this Comment.
1 Andrew Cohen, ‘I’m Just Happy to Be Alive,’ THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/10/i-m-just-happy-to-be-alive.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 BRYAN STEVENSON , JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 66 (Spiegel & Grau
2015) (2014).
5 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 22 (2011),
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judge-override.pdf
[hereinafter
DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA]. The Equal Justice Initiative, founded in 1989 by Bryan Stevenson, is “committed to ending mass incarceration and excessive punishment in the United States,
to challenging racial and economic injustice, and to protecting basic human rights for the most
vulnerable people in American society.” About EJI, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
https://eji.org/about-eji (last visited Jan 3, 2019).
6 Id.
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state of Alabama, “37% left death row after their convictions or sentences were reversed.”7
Capital punishment in the United States has been on the decline
with regards to public perception, with a 2017 Gallup poll indicating
that support for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972.8 The institutions supporting the death penalty have had to react to this change in
the American consciousness, enacting slow reform to a broken system.9
In the midst of the bipartisan push for criminal justice reform, 10 Alabama remained the only state utilizing the archaic process of judicial
override.11 Judicial override was enacted as a political response to the
abolition of the death penalty by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.12 Judicial override gives a trial judge the ability to override a jury’s
advisory sentence in a capital punishment case,13 and in the majority of
judicial override cases in Alabama, a judge has overridden a jury’s recommendation of life in prison with the death sentence.14 A recent Supreme Court case, Hurst v. Florida, holds that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to be the ultimate fact-finder in order to sentence a defendant to death.15 As a result, Alabama’s legislature amended its capital

7

Id.
Brett Samuels, Support for Death Penalty at Lowest Level in 45 Years, THE HILL (Oct. 26,
2017, 9:56 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/357285-support-for-deathpenalty-at-lowest-level-in-45-years (noting that in 1972, 50% of people supported the death
penalty for convicted murderers).
9 Jon Herskovitz, U.S. Death Penalties, Executions Slow as Capital Punishment is Squeezed,
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2015, 9:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-execution/u-sdeath-penalties-executions-slow-as-capital-punishment-is-squeezedidUSKCN0T40OV20151115 (discussing state, prosecutorial, and lawmaker responses to instituted death penalty reforms).
10 Seung Min Kim, Senators Unveil Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform Package, POLITICO
(Oct. 4, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/04/senate-bipartisan-billcriminal-justice-reform-243455; Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senatecriminal-justice-bill.html?login=email&auth=login-email.
11 Gigi Douban, Alabama Lawmakers Move to Abolish Judicial Override, NPR (Mar. 2, 2017,
4:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/02/518197090/alabama-lawmakers-move-to-abolishjudicial-override.
12 See DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 9–10. “States responded to Furman by
implementing new capital sentencing statutes that established procedures to regularize imposition of the death penalty and minimize the risk that death sentences will be imposed in error or
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Id.
13 Id. at 10.
14 Id. at 4 (“Since 1976, Alabama judges have overridden jury verdicts 107 times. Although
judges have authority to override life or death verdicts, in 92% of overrides elected judges have
overruled jury verdicts of life to impose the death penalty.”).
15 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 622 (2016).
8
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punishment statute to remove judicial override as an option in death sentencing.16
This Comment examines the history of judicial override in Alabama, the impact of Hurst v. Florida17 on capital punishment sentencing, and the steps that Alabama has taken to remove the last remnants
of judicial override.18 It also examines how the legislation has struggled
to fully eradicate the process from the state’s criminal justice system.
Specifically, Alabama’s prosecutors have pushed to have judicial override as an option for defendants who were charged, but not convicted,
of capital murder prior to the legislation enactment date.19 However, this
Comment argues that by looking at the legislative intent and language
of the act, the judiciary has an obligation to no longer utilize judicial
override to uphold the Constitutional standards set forth in Hurst.20 Part
II provides an overview of the judicial override system and how it was
enacted in Alabama after the seminal case of Furman v. Georgia.21 It
also examines the politicized role of judges in the state of Alabama and
how that has affected the use of judicial override.22 Part III.A. provides
an overview of the landmark Supreme Court case Hurst v. Florida, and
how it struck down Florida state’s capital sentencing scheme that included judicial override.23 Part III.B. examines how Delaware proactively removed judicial override from its sentencing procedures postHurst and how that set the stage for Alabama’s groundbreaking legislation.24 Part IV focuses on the Alabama legislation and breaks down what
the legislation consists of and its effect on the sentencing structure.25
Part V examines the status of capital sentencing in Alabama today and
the conflict that remains in the application of the legislation.26

Ryan Lovelace, Alabama Knocks Down Judicial Override in Death Penalty Cases, WASH.
EXAMINER (Apr. 12, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alabamaknocks-down-judicial-override-in-death-penalty-cases; Kim Chandler & Anthony Izaguirre,
Lawmakers Bar Alabama Judges from Overriding Juries, ASSOCIATED P RESS (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-04/alabama-house-tovote-on-ending-judicial-override.
17 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part V.
20 See infra Part III.A.
21 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); infra Part II.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See infra Part III.A.
24 See infra Part III.B.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See infra Part V.
16
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II. ALABAMA’S USE OF JUDICIAL OVERRIDE POST-FURMAN AND
THE POLITICIZATION OF ALABAMA’S JUDICIARY
In the historic case of Furman v. Georgia,27 the Supreme Court
set the stage for today’s death penalty sentencing structure. The Court
ruled that in order for the death penalty to adhere to the constitutional
standard set forth in the Eighth Amendment, death penalty sentencing
needs to be “evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require
judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively,
and spottily to unpopular groups.”28 In attempts to comply with Furman,
the states scrambled to adjust their death penalty statutes and the Court
approved numerous death penalty schemes in 1976.29 While executions
had increasingly become less frequent in the United States prior to the
Furman decision, states leapt at the chance to fight back against the federal government, seeing the Furman decision as an affront to states’
rights.30 Within the 1976 capital punishment decisions, the Court laid
out four guiding principles to ensure that states’ death penalty schemes
would remain constitutional:
[S]tates must guide sentencing discretion and narrow the
class of offenders subject to the punishment; (2) the
death penalty must be proportionate to the offense triggering the punishment; (3) defendants must receive an
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the
27

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 256.
29 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (noting the new sentencing procedures “focus
the jury’s attention” and avoid the jury from “wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the death
sentence”); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259–60 (1976) (holding Florida’s post-Furman
legislation “passes constitutional muster”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302
(1976) (finding North Carolina failed to “provide a constitutionally tolerable response to Furman’s rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences”); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (noting that by “narrowing its definition of capital murder[,]”
Texas’ capital sentencing procedures do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (holding Louisiana’s “mandatory death sentence
statute also fails to comply with Furman’s requirement that standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences”).
30 Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 289
(2008); See also DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 248 (2010) (“Furman’s invalidation of capital punishment was read in the
South as an illegitimate attack on the region’s cultural traditions by outside elites.”); CAROL S.
STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 75 (2016) (“By 1972, the controversy over busing and President Nixon’s successful politicization of criminal justice issues intensified the backlash [of Furman] in ways that
likely would have been avoided a half decade earlier.”).
28
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death penalty that includes consideration of their character, background, and the circumstances of the offense;
and (4) the categorical difference between death and all
other punishments (“death is different”) requires that
capital proceedings be especially fair and reliable.31
Essentially, all of the death penalty states enacted a bifurcated
capital trial system, creating two separate trials: the guilt-innocence
phase and the sentencing phase.32 This created a new responsibility for
prosecutors in cases where the death penalty was on the table, as they
needed to be able to prove to the jury the presence of specific aggravating factors in order to justify putting a defendant to death.33
The Supreme Court in 1976 did not create a clear standard for
whether the burden of capital sentencing relies on the judge or the jury.34
In fact, in Proffitt v. Florida, the Court recognized the “important societal function” of “jury sentencing in a capital case,” but that it is not
“suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”35 Through
various decisions, the Court clarified that capital cases required a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, regardless of who determined
the sentence, in order to decide if someone should be sentenced to
death.36 This weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was to ensure that the capital punishment system remained consistent and constitutional.37

31
32

STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 30, at 71.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. In Gregg, the Court stated:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met
by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of
sentence and provided with standards to guides its use of the information.

Id.
33 Smith, supra note 30, at 290.
34 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Roberts, 428 U.S.
325.
35 428 U.S. at 252 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
36 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (discussing the importance of “relevant facets of the character and record
of the individual offender or circumstances”).
37 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459–60.
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Due to the Court’s vague stance on a capital sentencing standard,
the Alabama legislature enacted judicial override.38 Under this legislation, after a jury decided whether to sentence a defendant charged with
a capital crime to death, the trial judge only needed to treat this decision
as advisory, giving judges the ability to override a jury’s sentencing decision.39 Alabama’s practice of judicial override was indirectly protected by the Court’s decision in Spaziano v. Florida,40 where the Court
upheld Florida’s sentencing scheme, which allowed a judge to treat jury
verdicts as merely advisory in nature and not binding on the court, as
constitutional.41 The Court asserted that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does
not require jury sentencing, that the demands of fairness and reliability
in capital cases do not require it, and that neither the nature of, nor the
purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury sentencing, we [the
Court] cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to
impose the sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional.”42
Harris v. Alabama43 directly upheld Alabama’s judicial override
statute, with the Court using its decision in Spaziano44 to assert that it
was acceptable to “vest sentencing authority in the judge and relegate
the jury to an advisory role.”45 While Florida and Alabama’s sentencing
statutes were extremely similar, they differed on one important part.
Florida judges were required to give jury recommendations “great
weight,”46 while Alabama judges were required to “consider [only] the
recommendation of the jury.”47 Through Harris, the Court declined to
enforce the stricter standard used in Florida on Alabama, citing the fear
of infringing on states’ rights, as well as arguing that “the Eighth
Amendment does not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must accord an advisory jury verdict.”48

38

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45–47 (1975).
Id. at § 13A-5-46.
40 468 U.S. 447, 466 (1984).
41 Id. at 464.
42 Id.
43 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
44 See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
45 Harris, 513 U.S. at 509.
46 Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
47 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (2005). In the 2017 amendment, subsection (e) was deleted. See
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2017).
48 Harris, 513 U.S. at 512 (asserting that forcing Alabama to follow Florida’s sentencing structure “would offend these established principles and place within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the State’s discretion to administer its criminal justice
system”).
39
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Historically, the use of judicial override in Alabama was seemingly applied arbitrarily, with inconsistent patterns of reasoning emerging from the bench for their decisions to override a jury’s recommendation.49 Between 1976 and 2011, Alabama judges overrode jury
sentences in capital punishment cases 107 times.50 Of those overrides,
92 percent of the cases ended in a judge overriding a jury’s recommendation of life in prison to sentence the defendant to death. 51 Under the
statute, Alabama judges needed to give the jury recommendation some
consideration, but the extent to which judges considered the jury’s advisory sentence remained ambiguous and subject to inconsistencies.52
These inconsistences include differing judicial weighing of mitigating
factors such as the jury’s decision to sentence the defendant to life,53 the
defendant’s age,54 and the defendant’s mental capacity.55 Historically,

49

See Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty
Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5, 28–32 (1994). Between 1981 and 1991, thirty out of thirty-six judicial
override sentencing orders were available. Id. at 28. In ten of the cases, the trial court offered
varied reasons for the override. Id. at 31. Russell further provides that:
In four of these cases, the trial court stated that it found that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed mitigating ones to a moral certainty . . . . In five
of these cases, the trial court concluded that the heinousness of the crime
was pivotal to its decision to override. Three of these cases where the trial
court took into account a crime’s heinousness also cite the deterrence rationale for capital punishment. In the single remaining case . . . the trial
court offered a standard for its decision to override: ‘[T]he Court finds that
there is a reasonable basis for enhancing the jury’s recommendation of sentence.’
Id. at 31–32 (emphasis in original).
50 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 7.
51 Id. at 14.
52 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2009) (“In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the
jury contained in its advisory verdict . . . . While the jury’s recommendation concerning sentence
shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court.”).
53 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 19 (“In the majority (57) of life-to-death overrides, judges did not consider the jury’s life verdict as a mitigating factor weighing against imposition of the death penalty.”).
54 Id. (“Nine judges have refused to find that the defendant’s age of 20-22 was mitigating at all;
four judges found that same age range to be mitigating; and one found it mitigating that the
defendant was as old as 26.”).
55 Id. at 20. (“In his order condemning John Neal to death despite the jury’s life verdict, Baldwin
County Judge Charles Partin determined that Mr. Neal’s 65 IQ classified him as having mild
mental retardation, but the judge asserted that ‘[t]he sociological literature suggests Gypsies
intentionally test low on standard IQ tests’ . . . . Macon County Judge Dale Segrest relied on his
own reading about personality disorders to conclude that Edward Evans was attempting to ‘stage
insanity’ and did not in fact suffer from a mental disease or defect . . . because it would be
‘dangerous policy for the law to suggest that the very factors that propel a defendant into a life
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the application of judicial override disproportionately affected AfricanAmerican defendants.56 These inconsistences indicate judicial override
was applied arbitrarily, without a standard that could be easily recognized by defendants or their attorneys.
A major flaw in the judicial override system that is omnipresent
in Alabama is the politicization of the judiciary within the state.57 Following Furman,58 support for capital punishment weakened on a national level; it was not until politicians turned capital punishment into
a partisan battle that support for the death penalty rose.59 Death sentences rose greatly after Furman.60 Citizens of states began to look
closer at judges and where they stood on the death penalty in criminal
cases.61 Carol and Jordan Steiker analyzed why the United States remains the only Western democracy to keep capital punishment as law,
writing that our culture is one focused on punitiveness mostly because
“[c]riminal justice in the United States is primarily a local function, and
the politics surrounding criminal justice tend to be more populist than
bureaucratic . . . .”62 That culture is prominent in Alabama local judicial
elections.
Alabama’s use of judicial override can be linked to the fact that
trial court judges in Alabama are elected, and the “tough on crime” platform has consistently resonated with Southern voters.63 Trial judges in
of crime in some way mitigate a defendant’s personal responsibility for the criminal activity.’
Mr. Evans hanged himself shortly after Judge Segrest overrode and sentenced him to death.”).
56 Id. at 18 (“African Americans in Alabama constitute 26% of the total population . . . [and]
more than half of the overrides in Alabama have imposed the death penalty on African-American defendants.”).
57 See Judicial Selection, EQUAL JUSTICE INST. (last visited Jan. 5, 2019), https://eji.org/judicialselection (noting that Alabama selects all their judges through partisan elections).
58 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
59 Smith, supra note 30, at 291–92 (discussing the “dramatic decline in the percentage of voters
who opposed capital punishment” after Furman and President Richard Nixon’s efforts to “move
the Supreme Court to the right on criminal justice issues”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 Id. 290–91 (“After a slow start in 1973, death sentences hit a three-decade high of 149 in
1974. In 1975, a whopping 298 death sentences were imposed–at the time, the highest year-end
figure ever recorded.”).
61 See id. at 328–29 (noting that voters are “likely to pay close attention to how judges approach
the criminal side of their dockets”).
62 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 30, at 72.
63 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 8 (“The data suggests that override in Alabama
is heavily influenced by arbitrary factors such as the timing of judicial elections, the politics of
the county where the accused is prosecuted, and the outsized enthusiasm of certain judges for
overriding jury life verdicts.”). The report further states:
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Alabama face elections every six years,64 making voter appeasement a
constraining concern. The Equal Justice Initiative reports that “[s]cholars observe that, in a state where the majority of people favors the death
penalty, ‘a judge who declines to hand down a sentence of death, or who
insists on upholding the Bill of Rights, may thereby sign his own political death warrant.’”65 Research has shown that during election years,
judicial overrides increase in Alabama, indicating that sentencing someone to death is one of the most important political tools Alabama judges
wield.66
Prior to the legislation removing judicial override from
Alabama’s statutory sentencing scheme, there was no language that
required a judge to provide a clear reason behind the decision to
override a jury’s verdict.67 The judge did not have to follow a formula,
unlike the jury, in determining whether or not the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones.68 In Ex Parte Taylor,69
the Supreme Court of Alabama enforced the notion that a judge needs
to lay out the specific reasons for overriding a jury’s verdict.70
In one campaign ad, Alabama Supreme Court candidate Claud Neilson
boasted that he “looked into the eyes of murderers and sentenced them to
death.” Another candidate for the state’s highest court, incumbent Kenneth
Ingram, ran a TV ad that opened with grainy videotape footage from inside
a convenience store where, 20 years earlier, a teenager had murdered the
owner. Here, said the ad’s narrator, “a 68-year-old woman, working alone,
was robbed, raped, stabbed 17 times, and murdered. Without blinking an
eye, Judge Kenneth Ingram sentenced the killer to die.” The victim’s daughter appears on screen to give her personal endorsement: “It was my mother
who was killed, and Judge Ingram gave us justice. Thank heaven Judge Ingram is on the supreme court.” Former Alabama Supreme Court Justice
Harold See ran an ad in 2000 showing a newspaper headline that read,
“Court upholds death sentences in two slayings” while the narrator stated
that See was “fighting against minor technicalities that would let criminals
off” and that “Justice See knows that drug dealers are dangerous criminals
who threaten our children . . . . [He] has the tough on crime record to be
Chief Justice.”
Id. at 14–15.
64 ALA. CODE § 17-14-6 (1975).
65 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 16.
66 STEVENSON, supra note 4, at 70 (“Judge overrides are an incredibly potent political tool. No
judge wants to deal with attack ads that highlight the grisly details of a murder case in which
the judge failed to impose the most severe punishment. Seen in that light, it’s not surprising the
judge overrides tend to increase in election years.”).
67 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1975).
68 Id.
69 808 So.2d 1215 (Ala. 2001).
70 Id. at 1219 (“Under Alabama’s capital-sentencing procedure, the trial judge must make specific written findings regarding the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance
and each mitigating circumstance offered by the parties.”).
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However, that standard has not been upheld by the trial courts of
Alabama.71 A defendant’s life can depend entirely on which judge
receives their case and how that judge feels about the sentencing
process, as well as other inconsistent factors such as lack of competent
counsel and racial bias.72
III. Impact of Hurst v. Florida
A. Hurst v. Florida Upholds the Sixth Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial and Strikes Down Florida’s Hybrid Capital Sentencing Scheme
Prior to its landmark decision in Hurst,73 the Supreme Court attempted to address the inconsistency that was present in capital sentencing with regards to a jury’s responsibility in Apprendi v. New Jersey.74
The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury, a statute
that allowed a judge to consider specific facts in order to sentence a
defendant with a hate crime that included a higher sentence was unconstitutional.75 Specifically, the Court held that it was “unconstitutional
for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant
is exposed . . . .”76 Bryan Stevenson, founder and director of the Equal
Justice Initiative, notes that the Apprendi77 decision is especially important because by addressing the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
in capital proceedings, “this broad characterization of the case cuts
through any technical distinctions between the trial and sentencing
stages of a capital case. It locates the right at issue to be the ‘right to a
jury trial,’ and not merely the right to a fundamentally fair or consistent
sentencing determination . . . .”78

71

See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 169 So.3d 1, 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); Yancey v. State, 65
So.3d 452, 480 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
72 Shannon Heery, If It’s Constitutional, Then What’s the Problem?: The Use of Judicial Override in Alabama Death Sentencing, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 347, 394–95 (2010) (discussing
the “host of . . . issues” impacting Alabama’s lack of “uniform[]. . . standard for imposing judicial override”).
73 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).
74 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
75 Id. at 476.
76
Id. at 490.
77 Id.
78 Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role
of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2003).
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A few years later, the Court used this important precedent regarding the Sixth Amendment and applied it to a capital case in Ring v.
Arizona.79 In Arizona’s capital punishment sentencing scheme, a judge
held the power to decide whether or not the necessary aggravating factors were present in a case to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.80 The Court held that this system did in fact violate a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury, overruling prior precedent in Walton
v. Arizona81 that held Arizona’s sentencing scheme constitutional.82 The
Ring decision looked at Justice Stevens’ dissent in Walton, where he
insisted that the Sixth Amendment did require “a jury determination of
facts that must be established before the death penalty may be imposed.”83 However, Ring did not stop Alabama from utilizing judicial
override, as the state courts in Alabama applied the Ring precedent very
narrowly.84 Regardless, Ring and Apprendi set the stage for the Hurst
decision.
In Hurst v. Florida,85 Timothy Lee Hurst was charged and found
guilty of first degree murder in Florida.86 The jury recommended the
death penalty and the judge agreed.87 Hurst appealed, arguing that the
sentence violated his right to a jury trial, especially in a post-Ring
world.88 The majority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined
by six other justices,89 held that Florida’s sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because the “Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a
judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s
mere recommendation is not enough.”90 The Court specifically pointed
to the new precedent set forth in Ring to justify why these hybrid sentencing structures could not stand as constitutional.91 The Court firmly
held that “the State cannot now treat the advisory recommendation by
the jury as the necessary factual finding that Ring requires,” making

79

536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 588.
81 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
82 Ring, 536 U.S. at 589; see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990).
83 Walton, 497 U.S. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-43(a),(d), 13A-5-45, 13A-5-53 (2005).
85 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).
86 Id. at 619.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 620.
89 Id. at 618.
90 Id. at 619.
91 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 621–22 (2016).
80
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Florida’s use of the jury recommendation as advisory only unconstitutional.92
B. Delaware’s Judiciary Takes Control and Strikes Down its
Capital Sentencing Scheme in the Wake of Hurst
After Hurst,93 Delaware’s judiciary quickly ruled their own judicial override sentencing structure unconstitutional in Rauf v. State.94
The decision found that Delaware’s capital sentencing scheme, which
allowed a judge to fact-find any aggravating circumstances, as well as
weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors before sentencing a defendant to death, was unconstitutional.95 Interestingly, Delaware also
upended the part of the death penalty statute that did not require juror
unanimity in sentencing someone to death.96 The court’s reasoning addressed the possibility that there could be a narrow view of Hurst that
allows a judge to have some control over the sentencing portion of a
death penalty case.97 However, Chief Justice Strine wrote in his concurrence that he “find[s] it impossible to embrace a reading of Hurst that
judicially draws a limit to the right to a jury in the death penalty context
of having the jury make only the determinations necessary to make the
defendant eligible to be sentenced to death by someone else, rather than
to make the determinations itself that must be made if the defendant is
in fact to receive a death sentence.”98 This decision in Delaware prepared the stage for Alabama’s capital sentencing structure to be scrutinized and eventually upended.
IV. ALABAMA’S LEGISLATION REMOVING JUDICIAL OVERRIDE AND
MAKING THE JURY THE ULTIMATE FACT-FINDER
IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
Over the years, Alabama has received much scrutiny for its capital punishment system from public interest organizations, legal scholars, and even the United Nations.99 The state’s citizens even began to
92 Id.

at 622.
Id.
94 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
95 Id. at 433.
96 Id. at 434.
97
Id. at 435 (Strine, J. concurring).
98 Id. at 436.
99 See Embracing a Culture of Life, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005 at 8A (“The Alabama
system is under review by the American Bar Association, the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama
93
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exhibit hesitancy towards using the death penalty after numerous studies
pointed out its flaws, beginning in 2005 when only 63 percent of the
population polled in Alabama supported capital punishment, a smaller
number than years before.100
In the wake of Hurst101 and Delaware’s decision in Rauf v.
State, Alabama bore an unfortunate distinction: it became the only
state in the country with judicial override, as well as having the highest
per capita death sentencing rate and execution rate in the United
States.103 The time had come to make a decision about whether or not
to address the override issue directly or wait for the Supreme Court to
intervene. State Senator Dick Brewbaker, a Republican, sponsored the
bill removing judicial override from the capital punishment sentencing
statute and made it clear to his constituents that it was not a stand against
the death penalty, but protection against federal intervention.104 Other
politicians discussed the moral implications of judicial override, while
also professing respect for the judiciary of the state.105
102

Senator Brewbaker introduced the legislation in February 2017
and Governor Ivey signed it into law on April 11, 2017.106 The language

and the state chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, among others.”); see also Mike
Hollis, Revise Alabama’s Death Penalty Law, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (July 20, 2011),
http://blog.al.com/times-views/2011/07/editorial_revise_alabamas_deat.html (“Because Alabama isn’t likely to turn its back on capital punishment anytime soon, lawmakers and judges
should reconsider [the part of judicial override] of the state’s death penalty law. Justice demands
fairness.”).
100 State Polls and Studies, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-pollsand-studies#alabama (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (stating the results of a Mobile Register/University of South Alabama poll).
101 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016).
102 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).
103 DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that in 2010 Alabama’s population
was 4.5 million and imposed “more new death sentences than Texas, with a population of 24
million”).
104See Chip Brownlee, Bill to End Judicial Override in Alabama Clears Senate, ALA. POLITICAL
REPORTER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.alreporter.com/2017/02/24/bill-end-judicial-overridealabama-clears-senate/ (“‘It wasn’t an anti-death-penalty vote,’ [Senator] Brewbaker said . . . .
‘It was cleaning up a procedure that is detrimental to the jury system and calls into question
jurisprudence in Alabama.’”).
105 See id. (“‘This is not an indictment or somehow anything against our judges,’ [Senator Cam]
Ward said . . . . ‘At the end of the day, it is morally wrong for us to allow this to continue in our
State. We have a jury system and a jury process for a reason.’”).
106 Kent Fault, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Bill: Judges Can No Longer Override Juries in
Death Penalty Cases, AL.COM (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2017/04/post_317.html.
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in the bill is crucial as it strikes all reference to “advisory” jury decisions
and gives the jury back it’s decision-making and fact-finding powers.107
V. JUDICIAL OVERRIDE IN ALABAMA IS NO MORE – WHAT NOW?
Judicial override is no longer a part of Alabama’s state law, but
the application of the new sentencing structure is proving to be another
fight for defendants. A conflict between defense attorneys and prosecutors in which defendants can benefit from the new sentencing scheme
has already arisen.108 The law became effective on April 11, 2017 and
state prosecutors argue that defendants “who were charged but not convicted of capital murder” prior to that date can still face the possibility
of judicial override.109 Defense attorneys are fighting back, arguing that
their clients who were charged, but not yet convicted, prior to April 11th
are owed the same protection as any defendant who has been charged
with a capital crime after the date.110
The issue arises out of the vagueness of the new law, which according to retired Judge John Carroll, “leaves open the question of
someone who has been charged but not convicted . . . . It’s not crystal
clear.”111 Prosecutors have argued that the act’s language stating that it
“shall not apply retroactively to any defendant who has previously been
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death prior to effective
date of this act” indicates that it is unambiguous and clear–defendants
who were charged with a capital crime prior to April 11th are still at risk
of having their jury sentences removed and replaced by a trial judge.112
The drafter of the act, State Senator Dick Brewbaker stated that “‘[t]he
intent of the legislature, and what we thought we were doing with passing the bill, was that upon signature of the governor, it would end judicial override in Alabama . . . I think everyone in that chamber who voted
for the bill thought, going forward, the juries’ wishes would be the last
word in all case.’”113
107

See 2017 Alabama Laws Act 2017-131 (S.B. 16).
See Ashley Remkus, Did Judicial Override End in Alabama? Some Say Judges Can Still
Overrule Jury Over Death Penalty, AL.COM (July 21, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2017/07/death_penalty_judicial_overrid.html.
109 Id.
110 Id.; see also Ashely Remkus, Lawyers Ask Judge to Ban Herself from Overriding Jury’s
Sentence in Death Penalty Case, AL.COM (July 19, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2018/07/stephen_stone_judicial_ov.html.
111 Remkus, Did Judicial Override End in Alabama, supra note 109.
112 Id.
113 Id.
108
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The language in the act that needs to be analyzed is the phrase
“convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.”114 The use of the
words “convicted” and “sentenced” clearly only applies to defendants
whose criminal cases were finalized prior to the enactment of the new
sentencing structure, meaning defendants who had already been convicted and sentenced in a court of law. For those defendants who were
pending trial after being charged with a capital eligible offense, the protection against judicial override applies to them. The legislative language and intent is clear: it is time for judicial override to be eradicated
in Alabama, and essentially, the United States.
CONCLUSION
Alabama should ensure that the legislation enacted in the wake
of Hurst should be applied to all defendants charged with capital murder
who are currently awaiting trial. The date of when they were charged
does not mean that the legislation does not apply to them. In fact, they
are exactly the defendants whom the legislation was intending to protect. Alabama’s long, robust history with the death penalty is enough
for the judiciary to approach this new sentencing structure with consistency. While Alabama’s legislation removing judicial override is a
step forward in the right direction, it needs to ensure that the effects of
the law affect all its citizens equally.

114

2017 Alabama Laws Act 2017-131 (S.B. 16).

